The Problem: A Structural Fundraising Crisis
The mid-market private equity landscape is under severe pressure. Fundraising timelines have extended dramatically over the past three years, with many managers spending 18 to 24 months on the road before closing. A growing number never close at all. The denominator effect, rising interest rates, and a broader LP flight to quality have concentrated capital into the largest platforms, leaving smaller and mid-market firms fighting for shrinking allocations.
This is not a cyclical dip. The structural dynamics have shifted. LPs are consolidating their GP relationships, re-upping with proven names, and demanding more operational capability, more reporting, and more co-investment opportunities than most mid-market teams can deliver alone. The result is a growing cohort of capable investment teams that lack the infrastructure, brand, or balance sheet to compete in the current fundraising environment.
Meanwhile, returns have softened across many vintages. Public markets delivered strong performance through 2023 and 2024, raising the bar for illiquidity premiums. Managers with mediocre track records face existential questions about their next fund.
The Three Options for Distressed Managers
Option A: Raise a New Fund
The traditional path, but increasingly difficult for mid-market managers without a top-quartile track record. LP due diligence cycles have lengthened. Minimum ticket sizes are rising. And first-time institutional allocations have declined sharply. For managers who have been in market for more than 12 months without a first close, the signal to LPs is already negative. Each additional month on the road erodes team morale, delays deployment, and increases the probability that key investment professionals leave for larger platforms.
Option B: Raise a Continuation Fund
Continuation vehicles have grown rapidly, but they are a portfolio management tool, not a platform solution. A continuation fund typically involves a single asset or a small number of assets being rolled into a new vehicle with fresh capital. It solves a specific problem: extending the hold period for a promising investment. It does not solve the structural problem of a manager who cannot raise their next blind pool. It does not provide working capital for the management company. It does not signal institutional quality to prospective LPs. And the GP/LP alignment dynamics are complex, with existing LPs often sceptical of the pricing and governance arrangements.
Option C: Sell a Minority Stake in the GP Entity
A minority GP stakes transaction is fundamentally different from the first two options. It is a permanent capital solution that addresses the structural challenges facing the management company itself:
- 1.Permanent capital injection: The GP receives balance sheet capital that is not tied to a single fund or investment. This provides working capital for operations, seed capital for new strategies, and a financial cushion during fundraising gaps.
- 2.Fee base stabilisation: The buyer's investment is backed by the recurring management fee stream. This aligns incentives and provides downside protection, while giving the manager liquidity without needing to raise a new fund.
- 3.Operational support: Established GP stakes buyers (Blue Owl, Dyal, Petershill, Bonaccord) bring operational teams that help with fundraising, LP relations, compliance, technology, and talent management. For a 50-person mid-market firm, this is transformational.
- 4.LP confidence signal: Having a blue-chip minority investor signals to LPs that the platform has been diligenced at a deeper level. This directly accelerates fundraising for subsequent vehicles.
What Our Data Shows
The GP Stakes platform tracks 6,038 active firms across private markets. Below, we present key signals from our database on manager health, fund performance, deal activity, and buyer landscape.
Manager Health: Hiring Signals
Hiring activity is a leading indicator of firm health. Managers that are not hiring are often in run-off mode or conserving capital.
Fund Performance: Vintage Year IRR Distribution
Sourced from US public pension disclosures. Shows the percentage of funds underperforming the typical 8% hurdle rate and those with negative returns.
| Vintage | Funds | Median IRR | Avg IRR | % Below 8% | % Negative |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 35 | 9.20% | 10.54% | 48.6% | 11.4% |
| 2011 | 79 | 12.40% | 12.89% | 24.1% | 11.4% |
| 2012 | 74 | 13.60% | 13.70% | 18.9% | 4.1% |
| 2013 | 71 | 11.80% | 13.17% | 26.8% | 5.6% |
| 2014 | 76 | 11.50% | 12.24% | 31.6% | 5.3% |
| 2015 | 101 | 14.96% | 14.69% | 19.8% | 3.0% |
| 2016 | 84 | 14.14% | 15.37% | 14.3% | 0.0% |
| 2017 | 92 | 17.10% | 16.57% | 18.5% | 5.4% |
| 2018 | 102 | 14.77% | 16.19% | 5.9% | 0.0% |
| 2019 | 140 | 13.62% | 15.48% | 14.3% | 2.1% |
| 2020 | 125 | 13.30% | 16.08% | 17.6% | 2.4% |
| 2021 | 176 | 8.92% | 9.68% | 43.2% | 11.9% |
| 2022 | 97 | 10.79% | 9.38% | 39.2% | 21.6% |
| 2023 | 40 | 8.30% | 5.28% | 47.5% | 30.0% |
| 2024 | 33 | 0.00% | 0.34% | 78.8% | 33.3% |
GP Stakes Deal Activity
| Year | Deals | Aggregate Value |
|---|---|---|
| 1987 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2001 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2004 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2005 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2006 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2007 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2010 | 3 | Undisclosed |
| 2011 | 2 | Undisclosed |
| 2012 | 3 | Undisclosed |
| 2013 | 1 | Undisclosed |
| 2014 | 5 | Undisclosed |
| 2015 | 6 | Undisclosed |
| 2016 | 9 | Undisclosed |
| 2017 | 3 | Undisclosed |
| 2018 | 9 | Undisclosed |
| 2019 | 16 | $400.0M |
| 2020 | 14 | $300.0M |
| 2021 | 13 | $4.7B |
| 2022 | 9 | $3.4B |
| 2023 | 9 | $2.0B |
| 2024 | 18 | $3.0B |
| 2025 | 17 | $198.3B |
| 2026 | 5 | Undisclosed |
Active GP Stakes Buyers
The following firms are the most active acquirers of minority GP stakes globally, ranked by deal count in our database.
| Buyer | Type | Deals | GP Stakes AUM | HQ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blackstone Strategic Partners | dedicated_fund | 0 | $18.0B | United States |
| Dyal Capital Partners | dedicated_fund | 0 | $30.0B | United States |
| Goldman Sachs Asset Management | bank | 0 | $10.0B | United States |
| Wafra | sovereign | 0 | $5.0B | Kuwait |
| Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) | sovereign | 0 | $10.0B | United Arab Emirates |
| Neuberger Berman | asset_manager | 0 | $5.0B | United States |
| HarbourVest Partners | dedicated_fund | 0 | $8.0B | United States |
| AlpInvest Partners | dedicated_fund | 0 | $5.0B | Netherlands |
| Morgan Stanley Investment Management | bank | 0 | $3.0B | United States |
| Pantheon Ventures | dedicated_fund | 0 | $4.0B | United Kingdom |
| Hamilton Lane | dedicated_fund | 0 | $5.0B | United States |
| StepStone Group | dedicated_fund | 0 | $4.0B | United States |
| Ardian | dedicated_fund | 0 | $3.0B | France |
| GIC | sovereign | 0 | $5.0B | Singapore |
| Petershill Partners | dedicated_fund | 0 | $55.0B | United States |
Why GP Stakes Transactions Make Sense Now
For Buyers
The current environment offers GP stakes buyers access to management fee streams at valuations below the peaks seen in 2021 and 2022. Distressed or sub-scale managers are more willing to transact, and the competition for deals at the mid-market level is less intense than for mega-cap platforms. Buyers can acquire recurring revenue streams backed by long-duration fund structures, with downside protection from the contractual nature of management fees.
For Managers
Selling a minority stake provides immediate balance sheet relief, access to operational resources that would take years to build internally, and a credibility boost that directly impacts fundraising outcomes. For founders approaching succession planning, it also creates a structured pathway for generational transitions. The alternative, continuing to operate independently in an increasingly challenging environment, carries rising execution risk.
For LPs
When a GP takes on an institutional minority investor, LPs benefit from enhanced governance, better reporting infrastructure, improved business continuity planning, and the implicit validation that comes from a sophisticated buyer having conducted deep due diligence on the platform. This reduces key person risk and improves the probability of successful subsequent fundraises, which protects existing LP investments in prior vintage funds.
Methodology
This report draws on data from the GP Stakes platform database, which aggregates information from multiple sources:
- GP directory: 6,038 active firms tracked with strategy, AUM, ownership structure, hiring signals, and stakeability scoring.
- Fund performance: IRR, TVPI, and DPI data sourced from US public pension fund disclosures (CalPERS, CalSTRS, WSIB, and others). Data quality varies by source and vintage.
- GP stakes deals: Transaction records compiled from public filings, press releases, and industry databases. Deal values are included where publicly reported.
- GP stakes buyers: Active buyer profiles with AUM, deal count, target strategies, and geographic focus.
- Stakeability scoring: A composite score (0 to 1) derived from team stability, growth trajectory, data quality, and market positioning signals.
All data is queried live from the platform database. Figures reflect the state of the database at the time of page load. Last generated: 3 February 2026.
Explore the Data
Dive deeper into our directory of 6,038 firms and identify emerging opportunities.
Last updated: 2026-02-03